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Abstract
We test Shimer’s (2005) theory of the sorting of workers between and within industrial
sectors based on directed search with coordination frictions, deliberately maintaining
its static general equilibrium framework. We fit the model to sector-specific wage,
vacancy and output data, including publicly-available statistics that characterize the
distribution of worker and employer wage heterogeneity across sectors. Our empirical
method is general and can be applied to a broad class of assignment models. The results
indicate that industries are the loci of sorting–more productive workers are employed
in more productive industries. The evidence confirms that strong assortative matching
can be present even when worker and employer components of wage heterogeneity are
weakly correlated.
1 Introduction
Since Sumner Slichter (1950) provided the first empirical evidence of the divergence be-
tween wages and measured productivity across industrial sectors, economists have generated
repeated empirical confirmations of this phenomenon. Observationally identical workers em-
ployed by observationally identical employers earn systematically different wages. These
earnings differences are strongly correlated with industrial sector and persistent over time.1
Nearly forty years later, Richard Thaler (1989) summarized the prevailing empirical evidence
and theories, concluding that none of the available models could explain persistent interindus-
try wage differences. Subsequently, the creation of longitudinally linked employer-employee
data coupled with the ability to perform high-dimensional statistical decompositions of these
data transformed the empirical foundations of this literature by documenting two statistical
regularities across a many different data sources. First, observed wages have substantial
variation due to the unmeasured individual and employer components. Second, the correla-
tion between worker and employer heterogeneity is empirically small and usually positive.2
We will follow the economics literature in referring to this wage decomposition, introduced
in Abowd et al. (1999), as the “AKM decomposition.”
Following the publication of statistical evidence that wage outcomes displayed unob-
servable heterogeneity in both employer and worker dimensions, two strands of theoretical
models, specifically built to accommodate these empirical regularities, emerged. The first,
best summarized by Mortensen (2003), explains these facts using a model with search fric-
tions where labor market matching is essentially random. The second, best summarized by
Shimer (2005), explains them with a model in which workers with varying levels of ability are
sorted to employers on the basis of job-specific productive assets. Although Shimer’s 2005
model has been extensively cited as providing a theoretical basis for assortative matching
that is consistent with the facts from longitudinally matched employer-employee data, it has
never been empirically tested.
1See Abowd, Kramarz, Lengermann, McKinney and Roux (2012) for an up-to-date summary.
2For example, see Abowd et al. (1999) for France, Abowd et al. (2003); Woodcock (2008) for the United
States, Mortensen (2003) for Denmark, Iranzo et al. (2008); Bartolucci and Devicienti (2012) for Italy, Card,
Heining and Kline (2013) for Germany, and Card, Cardoso and Kline (2013) for Portugal.
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1.1 A Direct Test of the Coordination Friction Model of Assorta-
tive Matching
In this paper, we directly implement a test of Shimer’s model that also addresses the most
serious criticisms that have been raised by other theorists, specifically the critique of Eeck-
hout and Kircher (2011). We maintain Shimer’s exact static general equilibrium framework.
The phenomenon under study – inter-industry wage differential – characterizes the cross-
sectional data in many labor markets and is persistent over time. While dynamic models
like those of Hagedorn et al. (2012) have many salient features, most of those features are
not needed to explain the between-sector variation in wage rates, and no model to date
successfully captures all the empirical features of matched data. Shimer’s model deserves to
be assessed directly on the labor market data that it was designed to explain.
Many models predict that more skilled workers should sort into more productive firms.
However, the negligible correlation between unobserved worker- and firm-specific components
of earnings in matched employer-employee data seems to be at odds with a labor market
characterized by strong assortative matching. As shown by Eeckhout and Kircher (2011),
earnings data are not sufficient to identify sorting on unobserved productivity. To reduce
the need for ancillary assumptions when implementing Shimer’s model and to acknowledge
the Eeckhout and Kircher critique, we use data on multiple outcomes: earnings, value-
added, vacancies, and employment, all of which have direct analogues in Shimer’s model, to
demonstrate that positive assortative matching across sectors is a prominent phenomenon
in the U.S. labor market.
Taking Shimer’s model of coordination frictions as the stationary general equilibrium
description of the market, we show that unobservable differences in worker productivity
are strongly positively correlated with unobservable differences in firm productivity across
sectors. However, unobservable differences in workers’ earnings are only weakly correlated
with unobservable firm differences in earnings – exactly as the coordination friction model
predicts.
The current literature’s focus on the aggregate correlation between worker and employer
components of earnings heterogeneity ignores considerable variation in pay within and across
industrial sectors. In contrast to the negligible aggregate correlations, Abowd, Kramarz,
Lengermann, McKinney and Roux (2012) find a strong positive relationship between the
industry-average person effect and the industry-average employer effect of 0.54 (see their
Table 3). The strong between-sector correlation suggests that different kinds of workers sort
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into particular industries, and are compensated differently there, just as Slichter observed in
1950 and Thaler summarized in 1989.
The different patterns of between- and within-sector variation in pay raise the question
of whether the process that matches workers to particular sectors is the same process that
matches them to jobs within sectors. Variation in wage heterogeneity, output, and employ-
ment across sectors can facilitate estimation and identification of sorting on the basis of
unobservable productive traits. But the factors that drive sorting within industries may
differ from the factors that drive sorting between industries. In our test of Shimer’s model,
we focus on whether the data can be explained by a model in which sorting across and
within sectors is driven by variation in the productive characteristics of workers and their
employers.
Our main substantive contribution is the direct test of Shimer’s 2005 model, which also
directly connects the literature on labor market sorting with that on inter-industry wage
differentials. We show that in the U.S. labor market sorting of the form described by Shimer
is an important determinant of these differences. Estimation requires longitudinally linked
employer-employee data with sufficient connectivity; however, Shimer’s model is static. We
therefore assume that the data generating process is a repeated sample from the equilibrium
of his coordination friction economy. Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) make similar assump-
tions. Shimer (2005, p. 1019) asserts that “. . . the model must be extended to a dynamic
framework if it is to be taken quantitatively seriously.” Our approach demonstrates that this
need not be the case. If the static model provides a good description of the distribution from
which observed matches are sampled in the longitudinal data, then our estimation strategy
is valid. A dynamic model is not required to complete the connection between the stylized
facts, the model, and the data. We push Shimer’s model by considering its ability to explain
the observed pattern of earnings between and within sectors. We expect future work will
– and should – extend the coordination-friction model theoretically and empirically to in-
corporate both dynamics and different forms of heterogeneity in assignment and production
technologies. However, these extensions are not necessary for the validity or significance of
our results.
The reduced-form evidence on inter-industry differentials, comprehensively summarized
in Abowd, Kramarz, Lengermann, McKinney and Roux (2012), has evolved by progressively
accounting for new sources of observable and unobservable heterogeneity. The early research
on sorting was focused, by necessity, on considering only sorting across industries. Our re-
sults suggest that it was right to do so. We find that industries are the loci of sorting –
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more productive workers are employed in more productive industries – thereby providing a
new perspective on both literatures. Consistent with Shimer’s conjectures, the small cor-
relation between person- and firm- effects in the AKM decomposition understates the true
extent of assortative matching. Furthermore, the model explains between-sector variation
in the observable productivity and wage data very well. However, the model has a mixed
performance in fitting within-sector variation in earnings heterogeneity. The model correctly
predicts the variation in worker-specific earnings heterogeneity, but it tends to under-predict
within-sector variation in employer earnings heterogeneity. It also tends to predict counter-
factually large, positive within-sector correlation between worker and employer effects.
To obtain our results, we make two methodological contributions. First, we develop
a new method to estimate the coordination friction model that is applicable to a broader
class of assignment models. Although the AKM decomposition is not a structural wage
equation (except under certain restrictive assumptions), it does contain useful information
on equilibrium matching and productivity. We derive a closed-form expression that relates
the observed distribution of worker and employer earnings components from AKM to the
Shimer model primitives. These expressions are also valid in any assignment model with
heterogeneous workers and employers that has: (1) a wage offer function that depends only
on the type of worker and the type of firm; (2) a prediction on the set of employment
relationships that are realized. We estimate the model by the simulated method of moments.
Since earnings data are not sufficient for identification, we also use data on sector-specific
vacancy rates, value-added, and employment shares, in addition to summary measures from
the AKM decomposition.
A second, complementary, contribution is to make available the complete set of data mo-
ments used in estimation. Doing so goes beyond standard best-practices regarding replication
because the essential matched employer-employee microdata used in this paper are confiden-
tial. While access is open, in practice obtaining it can be quite time-consuming.3 Researchers
studying labor market sorting can use our data and empirical strategy to estimate alternative
models of assignment and matching. We are not aware of another publicly available source of
comparably detailed summary data based on underlying matched employer-employee data.
We describe the data in Section 4 and our empirical approach in Section 5.
3Our public-use data include moments of wage components from the AKM decomposition for twenty
industrial sectors, stratified by firm size. In this paper, we do not use the employer size detail since Shimer
(2005) does not make any predictions related to firm size.
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1.2 Relation to the Earlier Literature
Our paper is also among the first to estimate a directed search model with two-sided het-
erogeneity, and the first to formally incorporate industrial sector heterogeneity. Unlike this
paper, most recent efforts to estimate assignment models draw on Shimer and Smith (2000),
extending Becker’s frictionless assignment model (Becker 1973). Becker’s model cannot
match the firm-specific variation in wages observed in the data. Adding frictions changes
the equilibrium so that it is more consistent with the reduced-form evidence from matched
employer-employee data. Shimer and Smith (2000) extend Becker’s model by allowing for
costly search, and establish conditions under which assortative matching still holds. In a
separate model, the one we consider in detail here, Shimer (2005) introduces coordination
frictions whereby workers and firms cannot perfectly coordinate on application strategies or
wage posting. Both Shimer models predict that assortative matching depends on the pro-
duction technology, and may be obscured in the correlation between worker and employer
effects in the AKM decomposition.
Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) discuss the general problem of identifying sorting in assign-
ment models based on Shimer and Smith (2000). In their setting, wages are not monotonic
in firm productivity, so wage data cannot be used to rank firms. This critique does not
directly apply to our paper, since wages are monotonically increasing in employer productiv-
ity in Shimer’s coordination friction model.4 However, a similar problem can arise because
wages are non-monotonic in worker productivity. Indeed, this aspect of the model is promi-
nent in our estimates. Recent papers by Hagedorn et al. (2012) and Lopes de Melo (2013)
also directly confront the problem raised by Eeckhout and Kircher (2011). We view their
contributions as complementary to ours.
There is very little published research that estimates structural assignment models, but
there are several related working papers. Lopes de Melo (2013) estimates a model with
two-sided heterogeneity and undirected search using matched employer-employee data from
Brazil. His results indicate that the AKM decomposition understates the true extent of
positive assortative matching. However, he finds that the undirected search model delivers
too little earnings heterogeneity across employers. Lise et al. (2013) estimate a model with
two-sided heterogeneity, undirected search, and wage renegotiation using data from NLSY79.
They find that the data are best fit by a model in which productive complementarities vary
across workers with different skill levels. Finally, Kennes and le Maire (2013) develop a
4See the discussion in Eeckhout and Kircher (2011, p.899) and the related Proposition 4 in Shimer (2005).
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dynamic directed-search model, and show that it provides a better fit to aggregate wage
and productivity distributions than a model without heterogeneity. None of these papers
considers the problem of sorting across versus within industrial sectors.
Shimer (2005) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) observe, correctly, that the correlation
between worker- and firm-specific components from the AKM decomposition cannot identify
the nature of assortative matching on latent productive characteristics. This point was
made earlier by Abowd and Kramarz (1999). Although it is frequently asserted (for example
Hagedorn et al. 2012) that Abowd et al. (1999) interpret the correlation between person
and firm effects as evidence against assortative matching, they were careful to avoid that
explicit structural interpretation. The first discussion of using the estimated heterogeneity
components to draw inferences about labor market sorting appears in Abowd and Kramarz
(1999). Abowd and Kramarz derive a matching model with homogeneous workers (see Table
2), a rent splitting model (see Table 3), and an incentive model with unobserved heterogeneity
(see Table 4). For each model they provide the exact link between the components of the
AKM decomposition and the structural differences in individual and employer productivity.
They also show that the model now known as exogenous mobility offers the only clean
interpretation of the least squares AKM estimates as direct measures of assortative matching.
Mortensen (2003, p.12) draws on the exogenous mobility interpretation when he cites the
negligible correlation as evidence in support of a wage posting model with undirected, on-
the-job search.
Although these models are much simpler than the one we employ, they clarify the role
of the AKM decomposition as a statistical description of labor market outcomes to be used
as one component of a full structural analysis.5 The recent literature, including this paper,
attempts to reconcile the statistical evidence in light of more general structural assignment
models. Nevertheless, objections to a particular structural interpretation do not imply ob-
jections to the reduced-form evidence provided by the AKM decomposition, which must be
consistent with the predictions of the structural models since it represents the best statistical
description of the actual data.6
5In their Section 5.5, Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) accurately criticize one set of assumptions on the
assignment process previously used to interpret the least squares correlation as a measure of sorting.
6A related, but different literature, directly considers violations of the exogenous mobility assumption
and, in particular, whether the firm effects in the AKM decomposition actually measure variation across
firms in compensation. See, for example, Card, Heining and Kline (2013) and Abowd and Schmutte (2015).
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2 Theoretical Assignment Model
In this section we summarize those features of the coordination friction model (Shimer 2005)
required for our analysis: the equilibrium wage offers and matching sets. Shimer’s model
extends the frictionless assignment model of Becker (1973) in which workers with different
ability apply for jobs with differently productive employers. Shimer’s central insight is that
in a large anonymous labor market, workers and employers cannot fully condition their
behavior on that of all other agents. In other words, they are restricted in their ability to
coordinate. In practice, this means employers post the same wage offers to all workers with
the same ability (a strategy restriction), and all workers of the same type follow the same
application strategy (an equilibrium refinement). The model predicts matching on the basis
of comparative advantage, as in Becker (1973), but with more empirically realistic features:
equilibrium mismatch and, consequently, wage variation across workers with the same ability.
2.1 Job Assignment with Coordination Frictions
The economy consists of workers, who maximize expected income, and employers, who maxi-
mize expected profit. Each employer has one vacancy to fill by hiring one worker. Employers
propose wage offers for each worker. Workers then choose to apply for exactly one vacancy.
Based on the pool of applicants, each employers hires one worker to fill its vacancy. Workers
and employers only differ in productive type. There are M types of workers and N types
of employers. When a worker of type m is hired by an employer of type n, the output of
production is xm,n.
A decentralized equilibrium of the coordination friction economy is characterized by
a randomized application strategy by workers and wage offers from employers of a given
productivity. The coordination friction implies that all agents of the same type use the
same strategy in equilibrium. Equilibrium depends only on the nature of the production
technology, the measure of each type of worker, and the measure of each type of employer.
Out of a total measure µ of workers in the economy, µm have productive type m ∈ {1 . . .M}.
Similarly, out of a total measure ν of employers in the economy, νn have productive type
n ∈ {1 . . . N}. Although it will not matter in the final equilibrium, we follow Shimer in
naming individual workers by (m, i) and individual employers by (n, j), where the first term
is the type of the agent, and the second term is the agent’s name. Thus, each worker or
employer can be uniquely identified.
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2.2 Worker and Employer Behavior
Each worker can apply for only one job, and chooses an application strategy based on wage
offers posted by employers. A type-m worker’s strategy, pm,(n,j), specifies the probability
with which she applies to each employer.
In the coordination friction economy, all workers of type m follow the same strategy. The
number of workers of each type is very large, so it is easier to think in terms of the queue of
applicants of type m to each employer. The number of applications from type m workers to
employer (n, j) follows a Poisson distribution with expectation qm,(n,j) = pm,(n,j)µm. Given
wage offers, equilibrium queue lengths must provide all workers of type m the same expected
income at jobs for which they apply with positive probability. A job for which a worker does
not apply must offer strictly lower expected income. The expected income from any job,
ym,(n,j), for which qm,(n,j) > 0 is:
ym,(n,j) = e
−Qm+1,(n,j) 1− e−qm,(n,j)
qm,(n,j)
wm,(n,j) (1)
where Qm+1,(n,j) =
∑M
m′=m+1 qm′,(n,j) is the queue of workers for employer (n, j) with produc-
tive type at least m+ 1; that is, the expected number of applications from workers who are
strictly more productive than a worker of type m.
Employers choose wage offers for workers of each productive type and a hiring rule that
maximizes expected profits, given the queuing behavior of workers. The type-n employer’s
optimal wage offer to a type-m employee maximizes net revenue times the probability that
a worker of that type will apply. Shimer (2005) shows that the optimal hiring rule selects
the applicant with highest ability. When following this rule, the expected profit of employer
(n, j) is given by
pi(n,j) =
M∑
m=1
e−Qm+1,(n,j)
[
1− e−qm,(n,j)] [xm,n − wm,(n,j)] . (2)
2.3 Search Equilibrium
Definition 1 (Shimer 2005) A Competitive Search Equilibrium consists of wage offers, w, and
queue lengths, q, chosen such that employer’s expected profits (2) are maximized, worker’s
expected incomes are given by (1), and the expected number of applications from type m
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workers does not exceed the total measure of such workers, µm:
µm ≥
N∑
n=1
∫ νn
0
qm,(n,j)dj =
N∑
n=1
qm,nνn. (3)
The equality of the second and third terms in (3) arises because workers of the same type
choose the same application strategy and firms of the same type make the same wage offers.
Shimer proves the competitive equilibrium exists and is unique. He also shows the equi-
librium queue lengths, qm,n, are those that would be chosen by a social planner seeking to
maximize expected output, and who also faces coordination frictions. Letting υm be the
multiplier on the resource constraint given by equation (3), the Lagrangian for the social
planning problem is
L (q, υ) =
M∑
m=1
{
N∑
n=1
νn
[
e−Qm+1,n
(
1− e−qm,n)xm,n]+ υm(µm − N∑
n=1
qm,nνn
)}
. (4)
The dependence on the individual’s identity, i, and the employer’s identity, j, are sup-
pressed because in equilibrium they are not relevant. Given the optimal queue lengths, and
the requirement that workers’ expected incomes satisfy (1), the equilibrium wages are:
wm,n =
qm,ne
−qm,n
1− e−qm,n
[
xm,n −
m−1∑
m′=1
e−Qm′+1,n
(
1− e−qm′,n)xm′,n] . (5)
2.4 Empirical Implications
Equations (4) and (5) provide all the information required for estimation. Given the pro-
duction technology, xm,n, and the measure of each type of employer and worker, equilibrium
wages and queue lengths are uniquely determined. Although the equilibrium queue lengths
are not observable, we can use them to derive the expected number of workers of type m
that ultimately become employed by employers of type n:
λm,n = νne
−Qm+1,n(1− e−qm,n). (6)
The coordination friction equilibrium has two properties that are essential to the estima-
tion strategy. In equilibrium, the wage offer function violates the law of one price. Different
jobs pay identically able workers different wages. That is, there is a structural employer effect
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in the wage. Shimer shows that the wage offer will generally be increasing in the productive
type of the employer. The equivalent result does not hold for workers, however. It is possible
for an employer to offer workers with low ability a higher equilibrium wage than workers with
higher ability. Therefore, it is possible to observe a negative correlation between worker and
employer effects estimated from the empirical earnings decomposition even when there is
positive assortative matching on the unobserved ability/productivity types.
Note, however, that the model does not generally imply that log earnings can be additively
decomposed into the sum of a worker and firm effect. An additive wage offer model is not
required for our estimation procedure. The worker and firm effects from the statistical
decomposition of log earnings in a linear model are complicated transformations of the
underlying productivities and abilities along with factors determining the supply of and
demand for worker skill. As we show, Shimer’s coordination friction model provides exact
formulas for these transformations that we can identify because they restrict observable
moments of the joint distribution of the estimated worker and firm effects from the earnings
decomposition.
Shimer derives several results on assortative matching. First, Shimer’s Proposition 3
shows that if the production function is supermodular and Qm,n > 0, then Qm,n is strictly
increasing in n, which is ordered from least to most productive employer. That is, the more
able workers are increasingly in the applicant pool for the more productive employers. In
addition, a more productive job is more likely to be filled, a worker is less likely to obtain
a more productive job conditional on applying for it, and for all levels of worker productiv-
ity, the wage is increasing in the employer’s productivity. These results hold for production
technologies that exhibit comparative advantage for high-ability workers in high-productivity
jobs. They also hold, as is well known, for a production technology that exhibits no compar-
ative advantage, specifically, one in which output is multiplicative in the productive types
of the worker and employer. A converse result holds when there is a comparative advantage
for low-ability workers in high-productivity jobs. In that case, Qm,n is decreasing in n, so
that the assortative matching again corresponds to comparative advantage. We estimate
the structural model with a CES production function that is sufficiently flexible to allow for
either positive or negative assortative matching.
On their own, these results do not distinguish the coordination friction economy, since
the frictionless model also predicts that job assignment will be in accord with comparative
advantage in production. However, the coordination friction model makes more reasonable
predictions about equilibrium unemployment and vacancies, and predicts a certain amount
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of mismatch, which eliminates the untenable “perfect correlation” prediction for worker
and employer types generated by comparative advantage models without the coordination
friction. Since workers apply to employers using a randomized mixed strategy, there is a
positive probability that multiple workers will apply for the same job–leaving all but one
unemployed. There is also a positive probability that no one will apply for any particular
job, leaving it vacant. Therefore, there will be simultaneous unemployment and job vacancy
for workers and employers of all types. Furthermore, even among employed workers and
occupied vacancies (filled jobs), there will be mismatch because the particular set of matches
realized in the economy could be improved, in the sense of increasing total output, by aligning
assignments that are mismatches more closely with comparative advantage.
3 Empirical and Theoretical Earnings Decomposition
The novelty in our empirical approach is to formally relate the equilibrium quantities from the
structural assignment model to heterogeneity components from the statistical decomposition
of earnings associated with workers and employers. The worker and employer effects from
the earnings decomposition are complicated transformations of the equilibrium quantities.
So is the correlation between worker and employer effects across realized matches, as well as
other moments of their observed joint distribution. We explicitly derive the map between
structural equilibrium quantities and empirical moments used for estimation.
3.1 Empirical AKM Decomposition
Following Abowd et al. (1999), we decompose the logarithm of the real annualized full-time
wage rate, lnwi,t in each job as:
lnwi,t = hi,tβ + θi + ψJ(i,t) + εi,t (7)
where lnwi,t is the log wage of worker i at time t; hi,tβ is the worker’s labor market experience,
and labor market attachment, interacted with sex; θi is the worker effect; J(i, t) is the
dominant employer of individual i at time t; ψJ(i,t) is the employer effect. We follow the
methods in Abowd et al. (2002) to obtain the full least squares solution and for identification
of worker and employer effects (7).
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3.2 Theoretical Wage Decomposition
The theoretical assignment model is a sample selection model. It characterizes potential
outcomes, which are the wages offered by any employer to any worker, and the manner in
which the job matches we observe, and their associated wages, are selected for observation
from the set of all possible matches. The theoretical model, therefore, predicts the empirical
moments, which are transformations of the equilibrium wage offers, w∗, and application
queues, q∗, given the model primitives (µ, ν, x). Given q∗, the model also predicts the
expected number of realized matches of each type, λ∗. Starred quantities represent solutions
to the coordination-friction general equilibrium described in Section 2.
Given the solution to the coordination friction problem, the statistical decomposition of
the log wage, analogous to the AKM decomposition of equation (7), paid in a realized match
between worker i ∈ (0, µ) and employer j ∈ (0, ν) is
lnw∗i,j = θ
∗
(m,i) + ψ
∗
(n,j). (8)
because wage offers do not vary within job types, nor within worker types; hence, there are
M ×N distinct wage offers.7 The expected equilibrium worker and employer effects are the
solution to the theoretical weighted least squares problem(
θˆ
∗
1, . . . , θˆ
∗
M , ψˆ
∗
1, . . . , ψˆ
∗
N
)
= (9)
arg min
[
M,N∑
m,n=1
λ∗m,n
(
lnw∗m,n − θ∗m − ψ∗n
)2]
.
Under the model, the AKM cross-product matrix is random noise around a low-dimension
kernel. The kernel is evident when we transform the least squares objective function (9) to
matrix notation:
M,N∑
m,n=1
λ∗m,n
(
lnw∗m,n − θ∗m − ψ∗n
)2
= (10)
(lnw∗ −Dθ∗ − Fψ∗)T Λ∗ (lnw∗ −Dθ∗ − Fψ∗) .
lnw∗ is an MN × 1 vector of equilibrium log wage offers. D is an MN ×M design matrix of
7Here, and throughout, we suppress the intercept in the AKM decomposition, implying that the model
is fit in deviations from the overall mean and that the average worker and firm effects are zero.
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worker types. F is an MN ×N design matrix of employer types. θ∗ and ψ∗ are conformable
vectors of theoretical heterogeneity components associated with worker and employer type.
Finally, Λ∗ = diag(λ∗) where λ∗ =
[
λ∗1,1, λ
∗
1,2, . . . , λ
∗
M,N
]T
is an MN × 1 vector whose λ∗m,n
element is the expected number of matches between workers of type m and employers of
type n given the equilibrium queues. It follows that[
θˆ
∗
ψˆ
∗
]
=
[
DTΛ∗D DTΛ∗F
F TΛ∗D F TΛ∗F
]− [
DT
F T
]
Λ∗ lnw∗. (11)
Equation (11) is a low-dimensional representation of the usual AKM least squares solution.
It defines the equilibrium quantity (θˆ
∗
, ψˆ
∗
)T as a transformation of λ∗ and w∗, which char-
acterizes equilibrium given model primitives. In the case of Shimer’s model these are the
distributions of workers and employers across productive types and the production technol-
ogy: (µ, ν, x). Our empirical strategy therefore requires a model that predicts equilibrium
matching sets and wage offers, but does not specifically require Shimer’s coordination friction
model.8
3.2.1 Identification of
(
θˆ
∗
, ψˆ
∗)
The model worker and employer wage effects,
(
θˆ
∗
, ψˆ
∗)
, are identified when the cross product
matrix in equation (11) has full rank, implying that the g-inverse can be replaced by a regular
inverse. This requires Λ∗ to have full rank as well as standard identifying restrictions on D
and F . Λ∗ has full rank only if each type of worker is hired by every type of employer with
positive probability.
For consistency with the empirical procedure applied to the LEHD data, we implement
identification in the theoretical decomposition by setting the mean overall worker and em-
ployer effects to zero across matches. We use the notation (θˆ
∗
, ψˆ
∗
) to refer to the components
of earnings derived from (11). For estimation, we match moments of the joint distribution
of (θˆ
∗
, ψˆ
∗
) across matches predicted under the model to their empirical counterparts.
4 Data and Estimating Equations
We use estimates of worker and employer effects from the AKM decomposition (7) applied
to LEHD data. For every employment match, in every year, we record the estimated worker
8Appendix C presents the case with a continuum of employer types.
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effect, θˆi, and estimated employer effect, ψˆJ(i,t), along with the NAICS sector to which the
employer belongs. The result is a dataset, (θˆi, ψˆJ(i,t), sJ(i,t))i,t, where sJ(i,t) ∈ {1, . . . , 20}
records the sector.
Within each sector, s, we estimate eight empirical moments:9
• g¯(s)1 = E(θˆ|s), the mean worker effect in sector s;
• g¯(s)2 = E(ψˆ|s), the mean employer effect in s;
• g¯(s)3 = V ar(θˆ|s), the variance of worker effects in s;
• g¯(s)4 = Cov(θˆ, ψˆ|s), the covariance between worker and employer effects in s;
• g¯(s)5 = V ar(ψˆ|s), the variance of employer effects in s;
• g¯(s)6 = Z(s), the share of matches in sector s;
• g¯(s)7 = R(s), the rate of vacant job openings in s;
• g¯(s)8 = Y (s), value-added per worker in s.
4.1 Data Sources
To compute moments g¯
(s)
1 , . . . , g¯
(s)
6 , we use matched employer-employee data from the Lon-
gitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Program of the U.S. Census Bureau. The
LEHD Program uses administrative data from state Unemployment Insurance wage records
and ES-202/QCEW establishment reports that cover approximately 98 percent of all non-
farm U.S. employment. Our estimation sample is based on a snapshot of the LEHD data
infrastructure that includes information from twenty-eight states collected between 1990 and
2004.10 Appendix B provides a detailed description of the LEHD data.
Data on sectoral vacancy rates, g¯
(s)
7 = R
(s), are from the Job Openings and Labor
Turnover Survey (JOLTS). The sectoral vacancy rates are reported in JOLTS as
R(s) = E
(
V acj
Empj + V acj
|sj = s
)
, (12)
9We estimate the sampling covariance of g¯
(s)
1 , . . . , g¯
(s)
6 , using 1, 000 bootstrap samples from the raw
microdata. The estimated sampling covariance matrix is included with the data archive.
10Only the first quarter of 2004 is available in this snapshot. The annualized real wage rate is, therefore,
only available for the years 1990-2003.
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where V acj is the number of openings reported by employer j, and Empj is employment.
This statistic has an interpretation as the probability that a job opening in sector s is left
vacant. Using the monthly JOLTS data disaggregated by sector for the years 2001-2003, we
compute g¯
(s)
7 as the simple average of the monthly observations for sector s. To measure the
sampling variance of g¯
(s)
7 , we combined the median cross-sectional standard error (squared)
of the job opening rate for each sector with that rate’s time-series variation.11
We measure sectoral productivity, g¯
(s)
8 , using data on value-added per worker from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Annual Industry Accounts.12 For each year between
1990-2003 (corresponding to our years of LEHD data), we take the BEA report of total
value-added by NAICS sector in millions of chained 2005 dollars and deflate by reported
employment in that sector. This yields a measure of value-added per worker for each year.
We compute the moment used in estimation, g¯
(s)
8 , and its sampling variance, s
(s)
8 , as the
simple average and variance across the annual observations for sector k.
4.2 Data Summary and Data Availability
Table 1 reports the empirical moments used in estimation. These moments are publicly
available in more detail than we report here. The moments of worker and employer effects are
available disaggregated by firm size within sectors. Bootstrapped estimates of the sampling
covariances are also available.13 It is not trivial to provide these data while maintaining
the confidentiality of respondents providing the underlying microdata. The Census Bureau
is not generally willing to release detailed descriptive statistics apart from the normally
published data products. The data we have made available are protected by a distribution-
preserving noise-infusion procedure. Each element of the microdata has been distorted in
such a way that the individual observations are protected, yet the aggregate statistics are
still analytically valid. The noise-infusion procedure is also used by the LEHD Program
to generate the public-use Quarterly Workforce Indicators. For complete details of the
noise infusion procedure and the way it preserves analytical validity, see Abowd, Gittings,
McKinney, Stephens, Vilhuber and Woodcock (2012).
11The sectoral classification for the public-use JOLTS data does not quite conform to the NAICS 2002
major sectors. We use a custom crosswalk that maps JOLTS sectors, which are generally more coarse, onto
NAICS 2002. The details of the crosswalk are available upon request. We obtained median standard errors
for 2013 by industry from JOLTSInfo@bls.gov.
12The BEA data are from the files GDPbyInd VA NAICS 1998-2011.xlsx and
GDPbyInd VA NAICS 1947-1997.xls, retrieved from http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind data.htm
on 2013-03-20.
13The data are permanently archived at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ldi/21.
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Table 1: Empirical Moments by NAICS Major Sector
Cov Emp. Vac. Val. Corr
Sector E(θ) E(ψ) Var(θ) (θ, ψ) Var(ψ) Share Rate Add. (θ, ψ)
Agr. and related -0.158 -0.194 0.533 0.016 0.188 0.015 0.016 0.066 0.052
Administration -0.084 -0.112 0.483 0.053 0.198 0.064 0.039 0.037 0.170
Other Services -0.036 -0.044 0.451 -0.042 0.234 0.031 0.032 0.051 -0.129
Manufacturing -0.007 0.292 0.293 0.007 0.079 0.164 0.016 0.069 0.047
Accommodation 0.010 -0.358 0.468 -0.009 0.099 0.055 0.038 0.031 -0.044
Health 0.034 0.080 0.422 0.008 0.082 0.099 0.046 0.057 0.041
Utilities 0.035 0.535 0.210 -0.019 0.092 0.008 0.021 0.316 -0.135
Transportation 0.036 0.142 0.334 -0.014 0.113 0.037 0.021 0.068 -0.070
Govt. Services 0.039 0.121 0.318 -0.015 0.107 0.043 0.019 0.065 -0.083
Mining 0.040 0.486 0.334 0.005 0.088 0.005 0.016 0.461 0.027
Construction 0.040 0.204 0.334 -0.005 0.106 0.067 0.019 0.097 -0.027
Real Estate 0.041 0.071 0.436 -0.012 0.160 0.016 0.023 0.652 -0.043
Retail 0.076 -0.119 0.391 -0.007 0.106 0.111 0.024 0.044 -0.036
Arts 0.100 -0.225 0.569 -0.004 0.248 0.013 0.031 0.063 -0.012
Wholesale 0.124 0.232 0.361 0.002 0.118 0.052 0.021 0.086 0.010
Information 0.166 0.287 0.462 0.001 0.234 0.030 0.028 0.113 0.030
Finance 0.168 0.275 0.358 0.005 0.088 0.049 0.032 0.129 0.026
Management 0.187 0.348 0.379 0.014 0.087 0.007 0.039 0.121 0.078
Professions 0.221 0.317 0.408 0.017 0.214 0.058 0.039 0.103 0.057
Education 0.236 -0.175 0.455 -0.027 0.087 0.076 0.019 0.047 -0.137
SOURCE - The moments in θ and ψ are based on authors’ calculations of person- and firm-specific
components of log earnings. These, and the employment shares, are estimated from LEHD data
between 1990-2003. Data on value-added per worker by sector are as reported in the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) Annual Industry Accounts.
5 Parameterization and Estimation Details
We fit the coordination friction model to 159 unrestricted moments.14 The model predicts
the components of the AKM decomposition, (θˆ
∗
, ψˆ
∗
), their joint distribution in realized
matches within and across sectors, the sectoral distribution of employment, sectoral output
per worker, and sectoral vacancies. This is sufficient information to compute theoretical
analogues to the empirical moments. Formulas for the estimating equations in terms of
model primitives and equilibrium quantities are fully specified in Appendix E.
5.1 Parameterization of the Coordination Friction Economy
We fit a vector, ζ = (µ, ν, h, χ, ε, φ, β, ρ, ς), of 52 structural parameters. The parameter µm
measures the share of workers of type m. We assume M = 5 types of worker and impose,
14Because the employment shares sum to one, we delete one sector share–NAICS government (92).
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without loss of generality, that
∑
m′ µm′ = 1, leaving four free parameters. Each type m
worker is endowed with productivity, hm ∈ (0, 1).15 In estimation, we require that the
worker productivity distribution have mass at h2 = 0.25 and h4 = 0.75. We then estimate
h1, h3, and h5 as free parameters on [0, 0.25), (0.25, 0.75), and (0.75, 1], respectively.
The model assumes a single dimension of productive heterogeneity across employers. We
now specify how productivity varies across and within sector. We model 20 sectors that each
offer 3 latent job types. There are thus N = 60 job types distinguished by productivity. The
index n of the job is (s, `), where s = 1, ..., 20 indicates the sector and ` = 1, ..., 3 indicates
the productive job type for that sector. The parameter νn = νs,` is the measure of jobs of
type n. The total number of openings in each sector is a free parameter, and we assume
openings are uniformly distributed across the three latent job types.
Employer productivity, kn = ks,` ∈ (0, 1), varies by sector and the latent job type. We
define kn as
kn ≡ ks,` = φχ(s) + (1− φ) εkj. (13)
where kj ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9} is a grid over latent levels of employer productivity. Productivity
depends on χ(s) ∈ (0, 1), a sector-specific productivity level, ε, a productivity dispersion
parameter, and φ, which determines how much of the variation in productivity is across
sectors and how much is within sectors.
Output is produced by combining worker and employer productivity according to a con-
stant returns to scale constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. The
CES production function can be either log supermodular or log submodular, and, as such,
admits either positive or negative assortative matching Shimer and Smith (2000).16 The
output from matching a type m worker to a type n employer is:
xm,n = A (βh
ρ
m + (1− β) kρn)1/ρ . (14)
A is total factor productivity, β is worker productivity’s share in output, and σ = 1/(1− ρ)
is the elasticity of substitution. β and ρ are free parameters to be estimated. We set the
TFP parameter to A = 300, 000 to match the scale of output.17
15We impose that worker productivity is strictly increasing across types: hm′ > hm whenever m
′ > m.
This restriction avoids solutions that simply relabel the worker types.
16See Shimer and Smith (2000) for details. For our application, the assumption of constant returns to
scale is not restrictive, since it amounts to a rescaling of the latent variables h and k.
17We experimented with estimating A directly. In practice, we get estimates of A close to the calibrated
level. Changing A does little to affect our qualitative results.
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The job openings rate from JOLTS likely understates the extent of labor demand, or
slot constraints, within sectors. Davis et al. (2013) report that 41.6 percent of hires occur
in establishments without a vacancy posting. Without correction, our model predicts many
more vacancies than reported by JOLTS. The discrepancy is due to a disconnect between the
model’s notion of a job opening, which represents a binding slot constraint, and the concept
measured in the data, which is the number of positions for which employers are actively
recruiting. We address this problem by introducing a parameter, ς ∈ [0, 1], that rescales the
level of vacancy rates while preserving their cross-sector variation.
5.2 Estimation Details
The moment estimator, ζˆΩ, solves
ζˆΩ = arg min(g¯ − γ(ζ))TΩ (g¯ − γ(ζ)) (15)
We solve equation (15) by Adaptive Simulated Annealing (ASA) (Ingber 1993), which allows
for adaptive rescaling of the parameter search.18 Simulated annealing is known to be effective
on related estimation problems (Goffe et al. 1994), and the ASA variant is particularly
useful in applications that involve a large parameter space and in which the sensitivity of
the objective function varies widely across the parameters. In practice, we set Ω = I, the
identity matrix.
At each iteration in the algorithm, ASA proposes a vector of structural parameters, ζ˜.
At ζ˜, we solve the planner’s problem in the coordination-friction economy in equation (4)
numerically. 19 Equilibrium queue lengths in the decentralized economy are identical to those
the planner chooses, and we obtain the equilibrium wage offers by application of equation
(5). With the matching set and wage offers in hand, we calculate the theoretical moments
as in Section 3.2.
Once the simulated annealing procedure converges to an estimate, ζˆA, we estimate its
covariance matrix as: (F TΩF )−1F TΩSΩF (F TΩF )−1 where F = F (ζ) = ∂f(ζ)
∂ζ
and S is the
covariance matrix of g¯.
18To implement ASA in MATLAB, we use the ASAMIN routine maintained by Shinichi Sakata (Sakata and
White 2001).
19The planner’s problem is convex, so a global minimum is guaranteed to exit.
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5.3 Identification
5.3.1 Identification of Equilibrium Wages and Matching Sets
The data generating process identifies the joint distribution of observed wages and error
components from the linear decomposition of log wages into person and employer-specific
components. From equation (11), the identified quantities are the wage components associ-
ated with each worker and employer heterogeneity class,
(
Dθˆ
∗
, F ψˆ
∗)
. The data also identify
their joint distribution with observed (log) wages across matches(
Λ∗ lnw∗,Λ∗Dθˆ
∗
,Λ∗Fψˆ
∗)
. (16)
Our identification argument relies on discretizing the worker and employer types across
matches. It follows that the expected equilibrium matching set, Λ∗, is identified by solving
for (Λ∗ − I) in
Λ∗Dθˆ
∗ −Dθˆ∗ = (Λ∗ − I)Dθˆ∗,
which is feasible since (Λ∗ − I) is diagonal. As long as Λ∗ is full rank, it is then possible to
recover the vector of equilibrium log wage offers lnw∗, from the observed wage distribution.
5.3.2 Identification of Equilibrium Queues and Match Output
Even though we observe which workers earn the most and which firms pay the most, we
cannot rank the classes by ability or productivity without additional model information.
Shimer’s model implies that expected income is identical across jobs for workers of a given
ability type. Furthermore, expected income is equal to the expected marginal product.
The number of available jobs of type n, νn, is identified from the observed vacancy rate in
the sector together with our assumption that vacancies are evenly distributed across latent
job types within sector. The equilibrium queue lengths are identified from the system based
on Equation (6):
λm,n
νn
= e−Qm+1,n
(
1− e−qm,n) . (17)
Given the ability ranking of worker types, this is a system of five equations in five unknowns
for each job type n with a unique solution. When the ability ranking of worker types is
not known, there is a separate system of equations for each possible ranking. We use the
additional information regarding income expectations to select the correct ranking.
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Under Shimer’s model, the worker expects income
ym,n = e
−Qm+1,n 1− e−qm,n
qm,n
wm,n. (18)
Furthermore, the model requires ym,n = ym,n′ ≡ υm for all jobs n and n′ for which type m
workers apply with positive probability.
Theorem 1 There exists a unique ranking of worker and employer types such that the equilib-
rium queue lengths derived from solving (17) also satisfies the restriction υm ≡ ym,n = ym,n′
for all jobs n and n′ that type m workers apply for with positive probability.
Proof. That such a ranking exists is ensured by the existence of a competitive equi-
librium. Our goal is to recover the equilibrium application queues associated with the true
ranking that generated the observed data, λm,n, wm,n, and νn. Combining equations (17)
and (18) and rearranging terms yields
ρm,n ≡ υmqm,n =
λm,n
νn
wm,n.
The right-hand side consists of observed data, which therefore identify the product ρm,n ≡
υmqm,n without further restriction. Suppose, by contradiction, there are two rankings that
simultaneously satisfy (17) and (18). Let q∗ and q∗∗ be the queues associated with each
respective ranking. Then each ranking must be associated with unique values for expected
income – υ∗m and υ
∗∗
m . This must be, since
q∗m,n =
λm,n
νn
wm,n
υ∗m
so the only variation in queues can arise from differences in expected income. Let mˆ∗ be the
worker type of highest ability under the first ranking. Then
λmˆ∗,n
νn
=
(
1− e−qmˆ∗,n) = (1− exp(−λmˆ∗,n
νn
wmˆ∗,n
υmˆ∗
))
which is defined over [0, 1], continuous, and monotonically decreasing in υmˆ∗ . Therefore by
the intermediate value theorem, there exists a unique solution υ∗mˆ∗ .
The theorem establishes that the equilibrium queues are identified using the employment
shares and the model’s restrictions on expected income. The key to identification is that
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the worker ability types are ranked by expected income, ym,n, even when wages, wm,n, are
non-monotonic in ability. With the equilibrium queues in hand, match output, xm,n, can
easily be recovered for each match from equation (5).
5.3.3 Parameter Identification
The preceding arguments establish that the primitives of the model, (µ, ν, x), are identi-
fied from the joint distribution of wages and the heterogeneity components from the AKM
decomposition along with information on the level of job vacancies. In addition to these min-
imal data requirements, the data used in estimation also include value-added per worker,
which is a source of over-identifying information. The parametric restrictions satisfy the
order condition required for identification. It remains to be shown that the model satisfies
the sufficient rank condition. We use the theoretical result that if the Jacobian, F (ζ), has
full-column rank at the minimizer, ζ0, and constant rank in a neighborhood around ζ0, then
ζ0 is locally identified (Ruud 2000). We verify that F (ζ0) is full rank. The smallest singular
value of F (ζ0) is the L
2-norm distance from F to the space of rank-deficient matrices (Golub
and Loan 1996). We verify that the smallest singular value is non-zero (1.647), which is
sufficient for local identification since the continuous differentiability of F in ζ ensures that
there is a neighborhood around ζ0 in which F always has full column rank.
5.4 Discussion of Key Assumptions
Data Generating Process
Equation (15) was formed from moments of the wage generating process that were sampled
annually from the linked employer-employee data or were produced annually from alternative
sources as noted in Section 4. We assume that the parameter vector ζ is temporally stable
and characterizes the general equilibrium at each moment that input data were sampled.
This is a maintained hypothesis of Shimer’s model.
Choice of the Number of Heterogeneity Types
In estimation, we assume five latent worker ability types and three latent employer produc-
tivity types within each sector, implying 60 different job types. We chose these values to
trade off richness of the model with parsimony in estimation. With regard to the number of
worker types, it is necessary to allow for more than two in order for an inversion of the rela-
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tionship between unobserved ability and wages to be estimable in the data. Our choice of five
worker types allows such an inversion to unfold at different points in the ability distribution.
Indeed, estimates that allow fewer worker types do not fit nearly as well. Allowing more
worker types did not yield much additional explanatory power. We estimate the model with
three latent employer types within each sector in an effort to capture the rich within-sector
variation in pay observed in the data, as well as the correlation between worker and firm
pay. Adding more latent employer types does not improve the model enough to overcome
any reasonable penalty for the additional free parameters.
6 Results
Our estimates indicate strong positive assortative matching in the assignment of workers
to employers across sectors. The AKM worker and employer effects conceal assortative
matching because of non-monotonicity in the estimated worker wage effects with respect to
worker ability. In combination with the selection of realized matches, this non-monotonicity
hides the true correlation between unobserved worker ability and employer productivity.20
6.1 Model Primitives
We first report the estimated model primitives: the distribution of workers across latent
ability types, the distribution of job openings across sectors and latent productivity types,
and the production function that characterizes match output.
6.1.1 Worker and Employer Populations
Table 2 reports the distribution of worker ability and predicted worker effects from the AKM
decomposition. In estimation, we impose, without loss of generality, that the population
of workers has measure 1, i.e., µ = 1. We estimate, without parametric restriction, the
share of workers in each of M = 5 latent productivity classes. Column (1) reports the
distribution of workers over types, and Column (2) reports the productivity of each type.
The population shares of ability types 1 − 5 are (0.374, 0.001, 0.030, 0.461, 0.134). Their
respective productivities are (0.141, 0.25, 0.285, 0.75, 0.893).
Table 3 describes the estimated population of employers. Employers are characterized by
heterogeneity in productivity that has two determinants – the sector, which is observable,
20Table A.1 presents estimates of the parameters of the structural model and associated standard errors.
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Table 2: Population Distribution and Equilibrium Matching of Workers by Ability Type
Worker Type Pop. Share Productivity Person Effect Emp. Share
(m) µm hm θˆ
∗
m
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 0.374 0.141 -0.175 0.292
2 0.001 0.250 -0.110 0.001
3 0.030 0.285 -0.026 0.032
4 0.461 0.750 0.172 0.487
5 0.134 0.893 -0.167 0.188
NOTE - The table entries are model parameters that characterize the predicted population heterogeneity
across the five latent worker types, and associated equilibrium quantities. See Table A.1 for associated
standard errors. In Column (2), the worker productivity parameters, h2 = 0.25 and h4 = 0.75, are imposed
during estimation. Column (3) reports the expected worker-specific component from applying the AKM
decomposition to log earnings under the equilibrium matching. Column (4) reports the expected employment
shares under the equilibrium matching.
and a latent productive type, which is not. The total measure of job openings per worker
is a free parameter for each sector. We report openings per worker in the first column. The
productivity of each job type is reported in the remaining three columns.
6.1.2 Production Technology
Match output is produced according to the constant elasticity of substitution production
function described in Section 5.1. We estimate σˆ = 0.828 (±0.00001), an elasticity of substi-
tution that implies that the economy-wide production function is log supermodular. Thus,
the model equilibrium should exhibit positive assortative matching. We also estimate the
worker productivity share as βˆ = 0.364 (±0.00002).
Figure 1 illustrates the estimated production function. Each point represents a potential
match that could be formed given the distribution of worker ability and employer produc-
tivity types. Employer productivity is shown on the horizontal axis, while the vertical axis
shows output. Output is measured in chained 2005 dollars to match sectoral data on value-
added per worker. Each line in the graph corresponds to the output produced by matching
a worker of a particular productive type to a job with the productivity level shown on the
horizontal axis. The figure illustrates the comparative advantage of high-ability workers in
high-productivity jobs. Workers of type 2 and 3 are almost equally productive. However,
there are very few such workers, so they have little effect on equilibrium quantities. Workers
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Table 3: Employer Productivity By Sector and Job Type
Employer Productivity
Sector Openings Low Prod. Mid. Prod. High Prod. Mean
Agr. and related 0.120 0.435 0.557 0.679 0.561
Mining 0.046 0.098 0.220 0.342 0.264
Utilities 0.004 0.607 0.729 0.852 0.732
Construction 0.072 0.590 0.713 0.835 0.715
Manufacturing 0.054 0.493 0.616 0.738 0.619
Wholesale 0.003 0.480 0.602 0.724 0.606
Retail 0.093 0.541 0.663 0.786 0.666
Transportation 0.045 0.212 0.334 0.456 0.347
Information 0.012 0.364 0.487 0.609 0.493
Finance 0.074 0.449 0.571 0.693 0.575
Real Estate 0.007 0.585 0.707 0.829 0.710
Professions 0.029 0.430 0.553 0.675 0.557
Management 0.080 0.538 0.661 0.783 0.664
Administration 0.021 0.483 0.606 0.728 0.609
Education 0.031 0.080 0.203 0.325 0.264
Health 0.015 0.329 0.451 0.574 0.458
Arts 0.096 0.501 0.624 0.746 0.627
Accommodation 0.092 0.091 0.214 0.336 0.263
Other Services 0.053 0.143 0.266 0.388 0.290
Govt. Services 0.054 0.239 0.361 0.483 0.372
NOTE - In the model, each sector contains low, middle, and high productivity jobs. The table entries report
productivity per job estimated under the model. See Table A.1 for associated standard errors. The final
column reports the employment-weighted average productivity per job in the sector.
of type 4 and 5 are much more productive than workers of type 1, but are themselves almost,
but not quite, perfect substitutes in production.
6.2 Model Equilibrium
Equilibrium is characterized by wage offers from each employer to each type of worker, and
by the resulting equilibrium application and hiring decisions. Figure 2 presents equilibrium
wage offers for each potential match. The vertical axis measures the equilibrium wage offer.
Each line represents the wages offered to workers of the indicated type by employers with the
level of productivity shown on the horizontal axis. Wage offers are increasing in employer
productivity, as the coordination friction model requires. The same is not true for the latent
worker productivity. Wage offers to the most able workers – ability type 5 – are actually
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Figure 1: Output per worker.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium wage offers.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium matching of workers to jobs.
lower than wage offers to less able workers. In the most productive jobs, high-ability workers
actually receive the lowest wage offers.
The nonmonotonicity result is a feature of the model and reflects a combination of general
equilibrium factors. Unemployment risk between type 4 and type 5 workers is discontinuously
greater than the productivity difference between those types. Employers always hire a type
5 worker before a type 4 worker if both apply. The higher wage offer to type 4 reflects
a compensating differential for unemployment risk resulting from the possibility of type 5
applications. The wage offers also reflect the marginal value to the employer of attracting
another application from each type of worker. We can interpret type 4 workers’ high wage
offer as a measure of their ability to hold the employer up when the employer actually needs
their labor because there are no type 5 applicants. From the employer’s perspective, the
value of the option to hire a type 4 worker, which requires that a type 4 worker apply, is very
high in the case that no type 5 worker applies. The hold-up power of type 5 workers is very
limited for two reasons: there are relatively many other type 5 workers, and type 4 workers
are close substitutes. Thus, the marginal value to the employer of a type 5 application is
low relative to the marginal value of a type 4 application.
The equilibrium matching is characterized in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 shows the share
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Figure 4: Equilibrium expected worker productivity.
of employment in each job type for each worker type. The vertical axis measures the share
of filled jobs. Each line records the share of jobs that are filled by workers of the indicated
type. For each employer productivity level on the horizontal axis, the sum of the share of
those jobs held by each worker type is one. Most jobs are filled by workers of type 1, 4, or
5, reflecting their population shares. Second, and more importantly, the Figure illustrates
the presence of positive assortative matching and the presence of matching frictions. Low-
productivity jobs are filled predominately by low-ability workers. High-productivity jobs
are filled predominately by high-ability workers. In the intermediate range of employer
productivity, we observe a substantial overlap of worker types. Jobs with productivity greater
than 0.2 are filled by all three common types of worker (1, 4, and 5), albeit in different
proportions.
The positive assortative matching is even more clearly shown in Figure 4, which displays
a scatter plot of job productivity versus the expected level of worker productivity. There
is no positive assortative matching at very low levels of employer productivity, since only
the least-able workers sort into those jobs. However, over most of the range of employer
productivity, the average level of human capital is monotonically increasing with job-specific
capital (employer productivity). This result implies, as we will see, positive assortative
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Figure 5: Mean worker effect (θ) against mean firm effect (ψ) in each sector, empirical and
actual. Actual values are indicated by squares. Predicted values are indicated by triangles.
matching both across and within sectors.
6.3 Model Fit
To evaluate model fit, we compare predicted to actual values of the observable moments
used to estimate the structural parameters. The model fit is particularly good on several
dimensions: the fitted moments associated with average worker effects in wages (θ), average
employer effects in wages (ψ), vacancy rates, value added per worker, and the variance
of worker effects all match the actual moments reasonably well. Figure 5 compares the
empirical and predicted equilibrium relationship between the average worker effect, E(θ),
and average employer effect, E(ψ), by sector. The black squares indicate the observed
values, and the triangles indicate the predicted values. The relationship between worker
and employer effects is strong and positive for the model predicted values, which clearly
capture the central tendency in the between-sector covariance of worker and firm earnings
components, though clearly not all of the between-sector variance.
Figure 6 displays the model fit by sector with respect to the worker and firm-specific
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Figure 6: Model Fit. Sectors sorted by predicted mean worker effect.
components of log earnings.21 Each panel reports for each sector the empirical data, the
predicted values, and the associated latent productivity component. The sectors are sorted
by the predicted average worker effect in that sector. For instance, Figure 6a reports for
each sector the empirical average worker effect, the expected average worker effect under the
model, and the expected average worker productivity.
Three features of Figures 6 and 7 stand out. First, the model does an acceptable job
matching the mean worker effects, mean employer effects, and the variance of worker effects.
Second, the model fails to predict the within-sector variance of the firm effects, predicts
21Complete details of model fit are provided in the Appendix in Tables A.2–A.3. Table A.3 reports the
raw (unscaled) difference between the empirical moments and the theoretical moments.
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Figure 7: Model Fit (Worker/Firm Correlation).
counterfactually large within-sector correlations, and is unable to generate negative within-
sector correlations. These results are consistent with the finding of Hornstein et al. (2011)
that wage dispersion is difficult to support in the absence of on-the-job search. Third, the
figures highlight the weakness of the relationship between the components of log earnings
and the underlying productivity of workers and jobs – confirming the empirical significance
of the coordination frictions. Even for those moments where the model fit is good, the
variation across sectors in predicted moments of the earnings components is only weakly
related to variation in the moments of worker ability and employer and productivity – again,
confirming the empirical significance of relaxing the comparative advantage model by adding
coordination frictions.
6.4 Discussion
Our estimates provide support for the central intuition that assortative matching may be
masked by a non-monotone relationship between wage offers and ability. Figure 8 illustrates
the non-monotonic relation using a scatter plot of two theoretical moments fit in our model
(the AKM analogues): the estimated average employer wage effect versus the estimated
average worker wage effect, for each sector-productivity class. The bubbles in the Figure
are scaled by the predicted number of matches. As the employer wage effect increases, the
expected worker wage effect increases, hits a maximum, and then decreases. This result
occurs because the predicted employer wage effect is monotonically increasing in employer
productivity. Because of assortative matching, the predicted worker ability is also increasing
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Figure 8: Theoretical average worker effect against expected firm effect. The bubbles are
scaled by expected employment in each job type.
with the predicted employer wage effect. As employer productivity increases, the share of
jobs filled by the highest-ability workers also increases. Because the highest-ability work-
ers actually get lower wage offers, they also have lower worker wage effects in their wage
data than lower-ability workers. Together, these factors pull down the average worker wage
effect in high employer-productivity sectors. This figure clearly illustrates that the AKM
decomoposition produces worker and employer wage effects that do not reveal assortative
matching even when the underlying ability and productivity distributions are so matched.
Nevertheless, the estimates also suggest that the between-sector correlation in worker
and employer effects is a reliable measure of assortative matching across sectors. Figure
9 illustrates this relationship with two scatter plots. The first is of the predicted mean
employer effect versus the predicted mean worker effect across sectors. The second scatter
plot is the predicted mean level of employer productivity versus the predicted mean level
of worker ability across sectors. The basic cross-sector correlations are very close, adding
support to the view that the model, while failing to explain within-sector variation, is very
useful for explaining the way workers sort across different industrial sectors.
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Figure 9: The left plot is of the predicted mean firm effect against the predicted mean
worker effect by sector. The right plot is the predicted mean employer productivity against
the predicted mean worker productivity.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we forged a synthesis between the theoretical literature on labor market as-
signment and the empirical literature on inter-industry wage differentials. Our synthesis is
valuable in both areas. The existing literature on assignment does not deal systematically
with sector-specific variation in productivity and wages. We find that sorting is best inter-
preted as a between-industry phenomenon. Positive assortative matching clearly explains
between-industry wage differences. We also find that sector-specific variation is useful for
identification of these models. The empirical work on inter-industry differentials has long
emphasized the importance of worker and employer heterogeneity, and the importance of
sorting, but has struggled over the proper interpretation of the reduced-form evidence. Our
estimates support the interpretation that more productive workers are positively sorted to
more productive employers. These results, then, provide strong structural underpinning to
the inter-industry wage differentials estimated by Abowd, Kramarz, Lengermann, McKinney
and Roux (2012).
We implemented the first formal test of Shimer’s model of job assignment with coordi-
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nation frictions, remaining fully consistent with its assumption of static general equilibrium
– an assumption that underlies the vast majority of models that have been suggested for
explaining inter-industry wage differences. We estimated the full structural model by the
method of simulated moments applied to sector-specific moments of the joint distribution
of worker and employer specific components of wage heterogeneity, along with data on va-
cancies, output, and employment. Our empirical method is applicable to any assignment
model that delivers predicted wage offers and matching sets. We make our input estimation
moments, which are derived from restricted-access LEHD data, available to the public. We
expect future work using these tools will sharpen our understanding of how the labor market
assigns workers across and within industries.
Between sectors, the empirical evidence of matching is attenuated in the earnings data
because high-productivity workers receive lower wages than workers who are almost, but
not quite as, productive. This is a stunning validation of Shimer’s original hypothesis that,
to guard against the possibility that, randomly, no higher-ability workers would apply for
a particular job, it is profit maximizing to offer some lower-ability workers a compensating
differential. Then, in equilibrium, there will be assortative matching when the technology is
appropriate, but the worker and firm components of log earnings will not mirror this sorting.
The result also confirms the points made by Abowd and Kramarz (1999) that the AKM
components could be related to structural components in a variety of ways that would not
necessarily imply that their correlation would reveal sorting in the labor market.
This paper is also among the first to estimate a structural assignment model with transfer-
able surplus using matched employer-employee data. Our results suggest the potential, and
the challenge, of using sectoral data to model labor market sorting. Exploiting cross-sector
variation in earnings, vacancies, and value-added, while useful for identification, but also of
primary economic interest. Assuming that employers operate a common production technol-
ogy, and that labor market sorting matches differently able workers to differently productive
jobs explains many features of the data, but fares poorly in predicting the within-sector
variation in earnings.
While direct measures of individual worker and job productivity within sectors are quite
rare, finding employer-level output measures would allow the use of within-sector moments
for more variables than just wage outcomes. Such a strategy is a potentially promising
way to provide additional empirical evidence on within-industry sorting to complement our
evidence on between-industry sorting.
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A For Online Publication Only – Additional Tables
and Figures
Table A.1: Estimated Model Parameters
Panel A: Sector-Specific Parameters Panel B: Global Parameters
Sector ν χ Parameter Estimate
Agr. and related 0.11997 0.11487 µ1 0.37392
(0.00004) (0.00001) (0.00279)
Mining 0.04554 0.98819 µ2 0.00098
(0.00017) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Utilities 0.00424 0.95985 µ3 0.03035
(0.00010) (0.00003) (0.00023)
Construction 0.07153 0.79299 µ4 0.46053
(0.00007) (0.00001) (0.00343)
Manufacturing 0.05437 0.76988 h1 0.14067
(0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00000)
Wholesale 0.00267 0.87517 h3 0.28493
(0.00005) (0.00000) (0.00002)
Retail 0.09273 0.31021 h5 0.89340
(0.00007) (0.00002) (0.00000)
Transportation 0.04480 0.57244 σ 0.82752
(0.00007) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Information 0.01162 0.71670 β 0.36445
(0.00005) (0.00000) (0.00002)
Finance 0.07427 0.94984 ε 0.58321
(0.00003) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Real Estate 0.00689 0.68567 φ 0.37283
(0.00007) (0.00001) (0.00002)
Professions 0.02887 0.87033 ς 0.076578
(0.00008) (0.00001) (0.00536)
Management 0.08014 0.77634
(0.00011) (0.00000)
Administration 0.02093 0.08540
(0.00005) (0.00001)
Education 0.03082 0.51122
(0.00029) (0.00001)
Health 0.01526 0.80682
(0.00015) (0.00001)
Arts 0.09624 0.10400
(0.00003) (0.00005)
Accommodation 0.09169 0.19347
(0.00004) (0.00002)
Other Services 0.05330 0.35656
(0.00014) (0.00001)
Govt. Services 0.05412 0.73432
(0.00007) (0.00001)
NOTE - Estimated parameters the structural coordination friction model and associated standard errors.
37
Table A.2: Best-fit Predicted Moments by NAICS Major Sector
Emp. Vac. Val. Corr
Sector E(θ) E(ψ) Var(θ) Cov(θ, ψ) Var(ψ) Share Rate Add. (θ, ψ)
Agr. and related -0.1752 -0.2432 0.4986 0.0921 0.0634 0.0957 0.0391 0.0772 0.5183
Administration -0.1612 -0.2500 0.5051 0.0814 0.0566 0.0158 0.0412 0.0765 0.4813
Other Services -0.0866 -0.1194 0.4521 0.0721 0.0652 0.0528 0.0301 0.0963 0.4202
Manufacturing 0.1144 0.1323 0.2832 0.0047 0.0286 0.0610 0.0239 0.1440 0.0520
Accommodation -0.1883 -0.2095 0.4833 0.1068 0.0710 0.0810 0.0351 0.0814 0.5762
Health 0.1220 0.1477 0.2728 0.0030 0.0278 0.0172 0.0235 0.1479 0.0345
Utilities 0.1335 0.2177 0.2319 0.0006 0.0196 0.0049 0.0222 0.1633 0.0095
Transportation 0.0587 0.0312 0.3533 0.0188 0.0363 0.0480 0.0262 0.1224 0.1655
Govt. Services 0.1065 0.1166 0.2939 0.0065 0.0295 0.0603 0.0243 0.1403 0.0697
Mining 0.1339 0.2304 0.2251 0.0006 0.0180 0.0529 0.0220 0.1661 0.0096
Construction 0.1192 0.1420 0.2766 0.0036 0.0280 0.0806 0.0237 0.1464 0.0410
Real Estate 0.0944 0.0936 0.3098 0.0094 0.0310 0.0076 0.0248 0.1351 0.0955
Retail -0.1498 -0.1489 0.4617 0.0980 0.0710 0.0896 0.0312 0.0906 0.5413
Arts -0.1710 -0.2464 0.5009 0.0888 0.0614 0.0753 0.0399 0.0769 0.5062
Wholesale 0.1323 0.1761 0.2546 0.0008 0.0257 0.0030 0.0229 0.1548 0.0098
Information 0.1023 0.1085 0.2995 0.0075 0.0300 0.0129 0.0245 0.1384 0.0788
Finance 0.1334 0.2131 0.2344 0.0007 0.0202 0.0858 0.0223 0.1623 0.0097
Management 0.1158 0.1351 0.2813 0.0044 0.0284 0.0900 0.0238 0.1447 0.0489
Professions 0.1322 0.1736 0.2560 0.0008 0.0261 0.0330 0.0230 0.1543 0.0100
Education 0.0335 -0.0092 0.3815 0.0265 0.0410 0.0325 0.0271 0.1153 0.2121
NOTE - The table entries are best-fit values for the predicted moments under the model. The sectors are
sorted by the mean empirical worker-effect, E(θ)). Corr(θ, ψ) is not fit in estimation since it is derived from
the empirical second moments, and is reported here for reference.
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Table A.3: Moments by NAICS Major Sector: Predicted Less Empirical
Emp. Vac. Val.
Sector E(θ) E(ψ) Var(θ) Cov(θ, ψ) Var(ψ) Share Rate Add.
Agr. and related -0.018 -0.049 -0.034 0.0757 -0.125 0.0806 0.0232 0.0109
Administration -0.077 -0.138 0.0219 0.0287 -0.141 -0.048 0.0025 0.0393
Other Services -0.051 -0.075 0.0015 0.114 -0.169 0.0221 -0.002 0.0457
Manufacturing 0.1217 -0.16 -0.009 -0.002 -0.051 -0.103 0.0074 0.0748
Accommodation -0.199 0.1481 0.0153 0.1161 -0.028 0.0262 -0.003 0.0505
Health 0.0883 0.0673 -0.149 -0.005 -0.054 -0.082 -0.022 0.0909
Utilities 0.0982 -0.317 0.0222 0.0193 -0.072 -0.003 0.0012 -0.153
Transportation 0.0226 -0.11 0.0197 0.0324 -0.077 0.0113 0.0051 0.0543
Govt. Services 0.0677 -0.004 -0.024 0.0217 -0.077 0.0177 0.0048 0.0753
Mining 0.0941 -0.256 -0.109 -0.004 -0.07 0.0477 0.0061 -0.295
Construction 0.0791 -0.062 -0.057 0.0087 -0.078 0.014 0.0045 0.0497
Real Estate 0.0533 0.0225 -0.126 0.0209 -0.129 -0.009 0.0014 -0.517
Retail -0.226 -0.03 0.0711 0.1054 -0.035 -0.022 0.0074 0.047
Arts -0.271 -0.022 -0.068 0.0931 -0.187 0.0623 0.0085 0.0138
Wholesale 0.0082 -0.056 -0.107 -0.001 -0.093 -0.049 0.0022 0.0693
Information -0.063 -0.178 -0.162 -0.002 -0.204 -0.017 -0.003 0.0259
Finance -0.034 -0.062 -0.123 -0.004 -0.067 0.0371 -0.01 0.0336
Management -0.071 -0.213 -0.097 -0.01 -0.059 0.0827 -0.015 0.0238
Professions -0.088 -0.143 -0.152 -0.016 -0.188 -0.025 -0.016 0.0517
Education -0.203 0.1657 -0.073 0.0539 -0.046 -0.043 0.008 0.068
NOTE - The table entries are differences between the best-fit values for the predicted mo-
ments (From Table A.2) and the empirical moments (from Table 1). The sectors are sorted
by the mean empirical worker-effect, E(θ)).
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Figure A.1: Plot of the mean worker effect (θ) in each sector against the mean firm effect
(ψ). The areas of the bubbles are scaled to represent the share of employment in each sector.
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Figure A.2: Plot of the average worker effect (θ) against the correlation between worker and
firm effects (Corr(θ, psi)) in each sector. The areas of the bubbles are scaled to represent
the share of employment in each sector.
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Figure A.3: Plot of the mean firm effect (ψ) against the variance of the worker effect (ψ)
within each sector. The areas of the bubbles are scaled to represent the share of employment
in each sector.
Figure A.4: Scatterplot of the theoretically predicted components of log wages across sectors
– the variance of the worker effect against the expected firm effect. The bubbles are scaled by
predicted employment in each sector. Compare to Figure A.2 which presents the empirical
counterpart.
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Figure A.5: Scatterplot of the theoretically predicted components of log wages across sectors
– the variance of the worker effect against the expected firm effect. The bubbles are scaled by
predicted employment in each sector. Compare to Figure A.3 which presents the empirical
counterpart.
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Figure A.6: Plotted points are employment-weighted average output per worker against
employment-weighted average productivity (capital) for each sector. Each line corresponds
to a different worker type.
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Figure A.7: Plotted points are the employment-weighted average wage offer against
employment-weighted average productivity (capital) for each sector. Each line corresponds
to a different worker type.
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Figure A.8: Plotted points are share of workers of each type employed in each sector against
employment-weighted average productivity (capital) for the sector. Each line corresponds
to a different worker type.
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Figure A.9: Plotted points are the employment-weighted average human capital matched to
a sector against the sectors employment-weighted average productivity (capital).
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B For Online Publication Only – Data Appendix
We use data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Program (LEHD), uni-
verse data for twenty-eight large American states with information from 1990-2004. Our
analysis sample is restricted to individuals aged 18-70, employed full-time at their dominant
employer. The following sections describe the underlying microdata sources and how we
construct the analysis variables and impose sample restrictions.
B.1 Unemployment Insurance
The individual data were derived from the universe of unemployment insurance (UI) quar-
terly wage records from twenty-eight states.22 The BLS Handbook of Methods (1997) de-
scribes UI coverage as “broad and basically comparable from state to state,” and claims over
96 percent of total wage and salary civilian nonfarm jobs were covered in 1994. The Federal
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), first enacted in 1938, lays the ground rules for the kinds
of employment which must be covered in state unemployment insurance laws. While tech-
nically mandating coverage of all employers with one or more employees in a calendar year,
FUTA allows for numerous exceptions to covered employment. These include workers at
small agricultural co-operatives, employees of the federal government, and certain employees
of state governments, most notably elected officials, members of the judiciary, and emergency
workers. According to the Handbook, UI wage records measure “gross wages and salaries,
bonuses, stock options, tips, and other gratuities, and the value of meals and lodging, where
supplied.” They do not include OASDI, health insurance, workers compensation, unemploy-
ment insurance, and private pension and welfare funds. Individuals are uniquely identified
and followed for all quarters in which their employers had reporting requirements in the UI
system. Thus, cross-state mobility can be observed for individuals moving between any of
states for which we have data. Although coverage dates vary, all states provide between
seven and thirteen years of data. In our analysis, by combining them into a single “pooled”
file, we have information on approximately 190 million workers, 10 million employers, and
660 million annual earnings records.
22We cannot disclose which states are included in the analysis as a condition imposed by the Census Bureau
on the public use data. We can, however, release the moment matrices used in the structural estimation,
upon request, as they have been designated as public-use data.
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B.2 Creation of Variables
Using Census Bureau and other LEHD data bases, sex, race, and date of birth are com-
bined with the individual earnings data using an exact match to administrative Upon each
individual’s first appearance in the data, labor force experience as potential labor force ex-
perience (age - education - 6) is calculated. In subsequent periods, experience is measured
as the sum of observed experience and initial (potential) experience. The UI wage records
connect individuals to every employer from which they received wages in any quarter of a
given calendar year. Therefore, individual employment histories are constructed using the
same personal identifier used in the individual data. Employers are identified by their state
unemployment insurance account number (SEIN). While large employers undoubtedly op-
erate in multiple states, their SEINs are unfortunately state specific, meaning they cannot
be connected. In addition, while we match workers to their employers, it is not possible
to connect those employed in firms with multiple establishments to specific places of work.
This problem is not overly pervasive, as over 70% of employment occurs in firms with only
a single establishment.
B.3 Earnings
For every year an individual appears in a state, a “dominant” employer — the employer for
whom the sum of quarterly earnings is the highest—is identified in order to better approx-
imate the individual’s full-time, full-year annual wage rate using the following steps. First,
define full quarter employment in quarter t as having an employment history with positive
earnings for quarters t − 1, t, and t + 1. Continuous employment during quarter t means
having an employment history with positive earnings for either t − 1 and t or t and t + 1.
Employment spells that are neither full quarter nor continuous are designated discontinuous.
If the individual was full quarter employed for at least one quarter at the dominant employer,
the annualized wage is computed as 4 times average full quarter earnings at that employer
(total full quarter earnings divided by the number of full quarters worked). This accounts for
84% of the person-year-state observations in our eventual analysis sample. Otherwise, if the
individual was continuously employed for at least one quarter at the dominant employer, the
annualized wage is average earnings in all continuous quarters of employment at the domi-
nant employer multiplied by 8 (i.e., 4 quarters divided by an expected employment duration
during the continuous quarters of 0.5). This accounts for 11% of all observations. For the
remaining 5%, annualized wages are average earnings in each quarter multiplied by 12 (i.e.,
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4 quarters divided by an expected employment duration during discontinuous quarters of
0.33).
B.4 Annual Hours of Work and Full-time Status
We restrict our sample to individuals who worked full-time for their dominant employer.
Full-time status is taken to mean that the individual worked at least 35 hours per week. The
average number of hours per week for a worker is given by dividing the number of hours
worked over the year with the dominant employer by the number of weeks worked. The
number of weeks worked is approximated based on the observed number of full, continuous,
and discontinuous quarters with one’s dominant employer. Specifically, we compute weeks
worked as 13 times the number of full quarters + 6.5 times the number of continuous quarters
+ 4.33 times the number of discontinuous quarters. Annual hours of work are observed for a
subset of individuals in the sample via a database link to other LEHD and Census sources.
For those missing annual hours of work, a value is statistically assigned using a Bayesian
multiple imputation procedure.
B.5 Human Capital Estimates
To the dominant job frame, we attach the variance components of earnings estimated from
the Abowd et al. (1999) human capital decomposition. The estimation of those variance
components in the LEHD data is the subject of another paper, Abowd et al. (2002), to
which we refer the interested reader.
C For Online Publication Only – An Economy with
Heterogeneous Workers and Firms
In this Appendix we derive worker and firm effects in an economy with only two types of
workers and a continuum of firms differing by size and production technology. Notation in
this appendix differs slightly from the notation in the main paper in order to accommodate
the more general specification.
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C.1 The Economy
Let the economy consist of two types of workers. This is not as limiting as it sounds, for it
may only represent heterogeneity inside a particular class of workers since we consider the
effects net of observables. The economy is divided in a finite number k¯ of industries. The
workers are hired by a continuum of firms, indexed by the share x of type 1 workers each
firm hires, the size t of the firm, and the industry k. The share x is unobserved by the
econometrician. In industry k, there is a mass (density) µk(x, t) of firms of type (k, x, t). We
omit from what follows the k index except when it is necessary.
The economy as a whole is represented by the space Ω = {Ω1, . . . ,Ωk¯} with Ωk = [0, 1]×
R+, the space defining each industry. There is a quantity (or number) J =
∫
Ω
dµ of firms,
Jk =
∫
Ωk
dµk in each industry. Firm (x, t) hires xt of type 1 workers, and (1− x)t of type 2.
We write
∫
Ω
xt dµ(x, t) = M and
∫
Ω
(1 − x)t dµ(x, t) = N so that there are M + N workers
in the economy. Type 1 workers earn w(x, t, k) in firm (x, t) in industry k while type 2 earn
u(x, t, k); the wage only depends on the industry, the share of type 1 workers, and the size
of the firm.
C.2 The Economy as Estimated by Person and Firm Effects
As in Abowd et al. (1999) (hereafter, AKM99), decompose the individual wage, lnwi,j(i,t),t,
after conditioning for observables, in each period as the sum of an individual effect, θi, a
firm effect, ψj(i,t), and a residual, εi,j(i),t
lnwi,j(i,t),t = θi + ψj(i,t) + εi,j(i),t
We consider here only the limiting (and purely theoretical) case where the number of time
periods goes to infinity and the workers visit ergodically all firms and all industries. This
frees us from the identification problem discussed in detail in the above paper. Moreover,
the effects estimated in AKM99 would converge in probability to the theoretical values we
show below.
In this case, even though the type of the worker is not directly known by the econome-
trician, observing the workers jump from job to job provides enough information to be able
to reduce the above ordinary least squares (OLS) problem to the following minimization
problem. Find W , U (worker effects) and ψ(k, x, t) (firm effect in industry k for a firm of
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size t hiring a proportion x of type 1 workers) that solve
min
W,U,ψ
∫
Ω
[
xt (w(x, t)−W − ψ(x, t))2 + (1− x)t (u(x, t)− U − ψ(x, t))2] dµ(x, t). (19)
This problem is exactly equivalent to minimizing the sum of squared residuals in ordinary
least squares. The solutions to this problem are unique up to a constant. We show that:
Theorem 2 Under integrability assumptions on w and u, the solutions to the OLS program
(19) are of the type
W =
∫
x(1− x)tw(x, t)∫
x(1− x)t + Λ, (20)
U =
∫
x(1− x)tu(x, t)∫
x(1− x)t + Λ, (21)
ψ(x, t) = x(w(x, t)−W ) + (1− x)(u(x, t)− U)− Λ (22)
where the integrals are all taken on Ω with respect to the measure µ, and Λ is an arbitrary
constant (we will set Λ = 0 in the rest of the paper).
Proof. Set U = 0 for the time being, as the solutions are only identified up to a constant.
Let us write J(W,ψ) =
∫
Ω
ρ(W,ψ)(x, t) dµ(x, t). J is defined on R×L2(Ω, µ), and may take
the value +∞. It is clear that ρ is convex in its two arguments (as sum of two squares);
hence J is also convex, and can be show to be strictly convex if w(x, t) − u(x, t) is not a
constant. Hence it has a unique minimum under this assumption, characterized by the first
order constraints ∫
Ω
xt(w(x, t)−W − ψ(x, t)) dµ(x, t) = 0 (23)∫
Ω
xt(w(x, t)−W − ψ(x, t)) + (1− x)t(u(x, t)− ψ(x, t)) = 0 (24)
Hence W =
∫
xt(w − ψ) dµ/ ∫ xt dB and ψ = x(w −W ) + (1 − x)u. Replacing ψ by this
last value in equation 23 and simplifying with the fact that
∫
x2t = M − ∫ x(1 − x)t and∫
x2tw =
∫
xtw − ∫ x(1− x)w proves the theorem.
Remark 3 (Some special cases) If all firms hire the same number of both types of workers,
the distribution µk for all k is δ1/2,2, a Dirac distribution of firms of equal size and same
number of type 1 workers. This leads to W =
∑
k wk/k¯, U =
∑
k uk/k¯, ψk =
1
2
(wk − w¯ +
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uk − u¯), where wk is the wage in industry k.
The case where the distribution µ has all mass in t at t = 2 and w(x, t) = u(x, t) + δ leads
to W = U + δ¯ and ψ(x, t) = u(x)− U .
We define the firm-employee effects covariances cov(θˆ, ψˆ) as∫
(xtW + (1− x)tU)ψ(x, t) dµ∫
t dµ
−
∫
(xtW + (1− x)tU) dµ∫
t dµ
∫
ψ(x, t) dµ∫
t dµ
(25)
For total covariance the integrals are taken over Ω, for within-sector covariance over Ωk for
all k, and the between-sector covariance is the discrete covariance between the means (i.e.
integrals) on the Ωk. Total covariance is as usual the sum of between-sector and within-sector
covariances.
D For Online Publication Only – Computing the The-
oretical Vacancy Rate
To derive the theoretical analogue to the empirical vacancy rates, recall that the empirical
moment measured in JOLTS is
g¯
(s)
7 = R
(s) = E
(
V acj
Empj + V acj
|sj = s
)
,
where the expectation is taken over all firms in sector s. This expression is interpreted as
the probability that a job opening in sector s is left vacant. Under the assignment model,
this expectation is
g¯
(s)
7 = Ej|sj=s
(
e−Q1j
)
, (26)
which is the theoretical probability that an open position does not attract any applications
in equilibrium. Since this probability is the same for all employers of the same type, n, we
can rewrite (26) as
Ej|sj=s
(
e−Q1,(n,j)
)
=
∑N
n=1 ν
(s)
n e
−Q(s)1,n∑N
n=1 ν
(s)
n
.
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We can express the numerator as the difference between openings and filled openings:
Ej|sj=s
(
e−Q1,(n,j)
)
=
∑N
n=1 ν
(s)
n −
(
1− e−Q(s)1,n
)
ν
(s)
n∑N
n=1 ν
(s)
n
. (27)
Because
(
1− e−Q(s)1,n
)
=
∑M
m=1 e
−Q(s)m+1,n(1− e−qm,n), equation (27) simplifies to
γ
(s)
7 (µ, ν, x) = E(g¯
(s)
7 ) =
∑N
n=1 ν
(s)
n −∑Mm=1∑Nn=1 λ(s)m,n∑N
n=1 ν
(s)
n
. (28)
The structural vacancy rate is equal to the difference between total openings and employment
in sector s as a share of total openings.
E For Online Publication Only – Estimating Equations
Let H(s) be an MN × 1 vector that selects jobs indexed by n ∈ {1, . . . , N} that are in sector
s, and let uMN be the MN × 1 unit vector. The expected value of θˆ∗ across matches in
sector k, given the model primitives, is
E
(
g¯
(s)
1
)
≡ γ(s)1 (θˆ
∗
, ψˆ
∗
, λ∗) =
∑M
m=1
∑
n:s(n)=s λ
∗
m,nθˆ
∗
m∑M
m=1
∑
n:s(n)=s λ
∗
m,n
. (29)
Equation (29) is the match-weighted sum of θˆ
∗
on matches in sector s normalized by the
total measure of such matches. This is more compactly expressed using matrix notation as
γ
(s)
1
(
θˆ
∗
, ψˆ
∗
, λ∗, x∗
)
=
H(s)TΛ∗Dθˆ
∗
H(s)TΛ∗uMN
. (30)
Analogously, the expected value of ψˆ
∗
is
E
(
g¯
(s)
2
)
≡ γ(s)2
(
θˆ
∗
, ψˆ
∗
, λ∗, x∗
)
=
H(s)TΛ∗Fψˆ
∗
H(s)TΛuMN
. (31)
54
The expected variance of θˆ
∗
is
E
(
g¯
(s)
3
)
≡ γ(s)3 (θˆ
∗
, ψˆ
∗
, λ∗) =
H(s)TΛ∗D
(
θˆ
∗)2
H(s)TΛ∗uMN
−
[
γ
(s)
1
(
θˆ
∗
, ψˆ
∗
, λ∗, x∗
)]2
, (32)
where
(
θˆ
∗)2
is the element-wise square of θˆ
∗
. The definition of E
(
g¯
(s)
4
)
, the expected
variance of ψˆ
∗
in sector s is exactly analogous. The expected covariance between θˆ
∗
and ψˆ
∗
across matches in sector s is
E
(
g¯
(s)
5
)
≡ γ(s)5 (θˆ
∗
, ψˆ
∗
, λ∗, x∗) = (33)
H(s)TΛ
(
Dθˆ
∗  Fψˆ∗
)
H(s)TΛ∗uMN
−
[
γ
(s)
1
(
θˆ
∗
, ψˆ
∗
, λ∗, x∗
)] [
γ
(s)
2
(
θˆ
∗
, ψˆ
∗
, λ∗, x∗
)]
,
where  indicates the element-wise product. The expected share of matches in sector s is
E
(
g¯
(s)
6
)
≡ γ(s)6
(
θˆ
∗
, ψˆ
∗
, λ∗, x∗
)
=
H(s)TΛ∗uMN
uTMNΛ
∗uMN
, (34)
where the numerator sums matches in sector s and the denominator computes the total
measure of realized matches.
JOLTS reports the sectoral vacancy rate as the number of vacant openings divided by
the sum of vacant openings and sectoral employment (equation 12). The model primitive
ν(s) is the theoretical analogue to the total number of openings. In the model, the measure
of vacant openings is the difference between total openings and filled openings. Hence, the
expected vacancy rate in sector s is
E
(
g¯
(s)
7
)
≡ γ(s)7
(
θˆ
∗
, ψˆ
∗
, λ∗, x∗
)
= ς
(
ν(s) −H(s)TΛ∗uMN
ν(s)
)
, (35)
where ς rescales the theoretical moments as discussed in Section 5.
Finally, expected output per worker in sector s is
E
(
g¯
(s)
8
)
≡ γ(s)8
(
θˆ
∗
, ψˆ
∗
, λ∗, x∗
)
=
H(s)TΛ∗x
H(s)TΛ∗uMN
, (36)
where x∗ is the MN × 1 vector of production parameters arranged to be conformable with
λ∗.
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